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THE EEC DIRECTIVE ON INSIDER TRADING: WILL
THERE BE A CURE BY 1992?
Thomas J. Ramsdell*
"If one adopts the point of view of a common European securities market, rather
than looking at what happens on a country by country basis, the situation cannot
be said to be satisfactory unless all the constituent elements of the market are
functioning efficiently and in a broadly equivalent way."'
INTRODUCTION
The internationalization2 of the world's securities markets, a new
phenomenon,3 has markedly transformed financial markets. Increased
concern for preserving the integrity of the markets through regulation
of insider trading is one of the most visible manifestations of this new
internationalization.4
Varied and complex forces underlie the internationalization of the
world securities markets. 5 The advance of technology is the most im-
portant influence in the recent trend toward market integration.6 This
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346 (1982).
2. See Comment, Insider Trading and the Internationalization of the Securities
Markets, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 409, 409 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets] (discussing the common usage of the word
"internationalization" to describe recent developments in the attempt to control insider
trading on the international level). Integration more accurately describes the current
situation, as world securities markets have established linkages such as stock quotation
sharing with the United States market. Id. at 411-15.
3. See Regulation of International Securities Markets, Exchange Release No. 33-
6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963 (Nov. 14, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Regulation] (stating that
international securities markets have grown substantially over recent years).
4. See id. at 13-14 (noting that regulators should strive for efficiency and fairness
in the world's security market system through regulation of insider trading and market
fraud).
5. See Kubler, Regulatory Problems in Internationalizing Trading Markets, 9 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 107, 107 (1987) (stating that the complexity of the international
securities markets tends to foster regulatory problems).
6. See Grunson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 303, 305 (1987) (stating that advances in modern technology
have fostered global expansion of securities markets technology); see also Comment,
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 2, at 410-11 (stating that
technological advances have strongly affected the modernization of the international-
ization process); Peters & Feldman, The Changing Structure of the Securities Mar-
kets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities Regulation,
9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 19, 21 (1987) (stating that the speed, accuracy, and
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new technology gives investors and market professionals the ability to
trade securities on virtually every national exchange in the world, thus
opening a vast new window of opportunity.7
The benefits of economic interdependence and a diversified portfolio
are major factors in world market integration.8 American investors and
businesspersons anxiously seek to take advantage of higher returns in
foreign markets9 and the various European privatization programs that
have afforded great investment opportunities.'0 Finally, numerous other
factors, including the need for capital fostered by third world develop-
ment," the relaxation of foreign exchange controls,' 2 and the demands
efficiency in transmitting information allowed investors to make investment decisions
more easily, permitting both investors and issuers to make use of information from all
global markets).
7. See Comment, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 2, at
411 (discussing the execution of trades in technologically advanced markets). The abil-
ity to monitor price movements and quotations around the globe is the most important
aspect of the technological advance in securities regulation. Id. This allows an investor
to monitor all price quotations for an internationally listed stock and to execute a trans-
action based upon the best market price. Id.
8. See id. at 409-10 (stating that one can reduce risk in an era of uncertain mar-
kets through portfolio diversification). The Securities and Exchange Commission states
that international investment diversification provides an element of risk reduction that
domestic investment alone cannot achieve. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IN-
TERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
11-4 (July 27, 1987).
9. See Sloane, The Lure of Investing Abroad, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at DI
(stating that many United States investors take advantage of stronger foreign markets
and currencies). In United States dollar terms, during the 18 month period between
December 31, 1985 and July 31, 1987, the Mexican market gained 543.83%, the
Spanish market gained 183.74 %, the Singapore market gained 130.84 %, the Japanese
market gained 167.46%, and the Hong Kong market gained 110.52%. Id. The United
States market gained 47.40% during the same period. Id.
10. See Peters & Feldman, supra note 6, at 21-22 (discussing various European
privatization programs). The United Kingdom and France have had several successful
public stock offerings with significant foreign investor participation. Id. at 22. Some
examples of these multinational common stock offerings in the United Kingdom in-
clude the $12 billion sale of British Petroleum, the $8 billion sale of British Gas, the $5
billion sale of British Telcom, and the $2.3 billion sale of Rolls Royce. Id. at 22 n.9.
France has sold some of its stock, and has urged its citizens to become stockholders.
N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at 15.
11. See Note, Toward the Unification of European Capital Markets: The EEC's
Proposed Directive on Insider Trading, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 432, 434 (1988) [here-
inafter Note, Toward the Unification] (stating that third world debt has contributed to
the worldwide demand for capital); Kubler, supra note 5, at 110-11 (stating that an
increased demand for capital created by the needs of developing nations has fostered
the internationalization process).
12. See Kubler, supra note 5, at 110 (stating that lesser controls on foreign ex-
changes has helped ease the movement of capital between markets).
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of industrialized societies,13 have added to the internationalization
process.14
While the factors contributing to the integration of the world securi-
ties markets are important, the implications of this process are para-
mount. The international securities markets are now interdependent."
As a result, a prospective investor can trade on the exchanges virtually
twenty-four hours a day from anywhere in the world."' This presents an
irony, as the same technologies that helped to develop a global securi-
ties market also have created the opportunity for international fraud.17
This Comment will explore one of the most visible practices impli-
cated by increasingly internationalized securities markets-insider
trading. Specifically, the Comment will address the issue of insider
trading in Europe in light of the internationalization process and the
prospect of unified financial markets in the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC or the Community) by 1992. Two EEC Member-States,
Great Britain and Germany, have addressed the issue of insider trading
in virtually opposite ways. By analyzing their insider trading regula-
tions with the recent EEC directive on insider trading, this Comment
will shed light on the prospects for substantive regulation of the world's
securities markets.
13. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 434 (stating that the eco-
nomic growth of industrialized nations has, among other factors, contributed to the
demand for capital); Kubler, supra note 5, at I I (stating that budget deficits in lead-
ing industrialized countries create a demand for capital).
14. See Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 2, at 411-13
(giving statistical breakdowns of the amounts of capital involved and the percentage
change in investment patterns of the various securities markets); Note, Toward the
Unification, supra note 11, at 434-35 (discussing the large increase in international
trade volumes over recent years); Kubler, supra note 5, at 107-10 (noting various
trends in the expansion of security trading); Peters & Feldman, supra note 6, at 22-24
(illustrating the internationalization of the international securities markets); Request
for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the World Securities Mar-
kets, Exchange Act Release No. 34-21958, 15 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (Apr. 18, 1985) (dis-
cussing various reasons for the internationalization process).
15. See Peters & Feldman, supra note 6, at 20, 37 (noting the interdependence of
the world securities markets, and illustrating this by analyzing the October 1987 mar-
ket break in an international context).
16. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing the technological ad-
vances that have fostered around-the-clock international securities markets).
17. See Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities
Markets: The "Waiver-by-Conduct" Concept-A Possible Alternative or a Starting
Point for Discussions?, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 477, 494-95 (1985) (commenting
that the new world economic order lends itself to business fraud).
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I. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND INSIDER TRADING
While the recent integration of the securities markets has created
substantial investment opportunities for prospective investors,1 8 it also
has exposed deficiencies in market regulation capabilities.1 9 The dispa-
rate degree of protection that the international investor receives in the
global marketplace most clearly illustrates these deficiencies.20 For ex-
ample, of the twelve member States comprising the European Eco-
nomic Community,21 only Great Britain, France, and Denmark have
codified prohibitions against insider trading.22
In addition, the differences between legal structures 23 and behavioral
attitudes2 in the various national systems create specific regulatory
problems. 25 The varying degrees of market regulation and investor pro-
18. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing how modern technol-
ogy has created new opportunities for the international investor).
19. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N POLICY STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS, INTERNATIONAL SERIES RELEASE No. 14 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter POLICY
STATEMENT] (discussing the inadequacies of the present regulatory system). Present
regulatory systems cannot keep pace with a 24-hour per day global trading scheme, as
quotation, price, and volume information is usually only available at the end of a trad-
ing day, or at fixed times during the day. Id. This effectively prevents the efficient
operation of the capital markets. Id.
20. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 435 (commenting that
some regulatory provisions require strict enforcement, while some do not provide any
insider restrictions); see also Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 860 (1983) (stating that various national markets traditionally
have not regulated or enforced existing regulations).
21. See Common Market in Profile, I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 101.07 (June
18, 1987) (noting that the 12 member-states of the EEC are: Belgium, France, West
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Den-
mark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal).
22. Nieuwdorp, EEC Harmonization Report, 16 INT'L BUS. LAW. 39, 42 (1988).
The Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland are considering legislation, while the Federal
Republic of Germany requires market professionals to observe a private civil code of
conduct. Id.
23. See Kubler, supra note 5, at 113 (stating that differences in regulations may
stem from differences in the structure of each country's existing system). A country's
private law traditions influence its substantive rules. Id. The problems associated with
automated settlement procedures reflect this influence. Id. For example, the United
States solves the problem through a trust relationship, while German settlement proce-
dures depend upon domestic property law. Id.
24. Id. at 115. Enforcement efforts and sanctions imposed depend upon the na-
tional philosophy of fairness in the distribution of corporate earnings between company
fiduciaries and investors. Id. For example, a country may not actively enforce insider
trading regulations if a concern for customer-broker confidentiality outweighs the con-
cern for policing insider trading. Id.
25. See id. at 112 (stating that varied treatment of the same situation in different
countries fosters international regulatory problems).
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tection threaten the efficiency of the markets26 and undermine their in-
tegrity.27 Potentially, investor decline and fraud will result.28
Finally, some speculate that developing a coordinated regulatory sys-
tem that will harmonize the insider trading regulations of the various
national markets is in the European Community's best interest. 2 In
fact, the former Director of the Division of Enforcement at the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) has commented that each for-
eign market has an interest in preventing its investors from being ex-
posed to a high level of protection in the home market and a reduced
level of protection on a foreign exchange.30 Although the process has
been slow and the outcomes are at best uncertain, over the past twenty
years several European countries have gradually moved towards stricter
insider trading prohibitions. 31 In 1989, the EEC adopted a uniform set
of provisions for the regulation of insider trading in the member-
states.32
26. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 12 (noting that regulatory measures
should work to promote market efficiency).
27. See Comment, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 2, at
419 (stating that most United States commentators recognize that insider trading frus-
trates the integrity of the market); Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11. at
436 (stating that the "proper functioning" of the market depends on investor
confidence).
28. POLIcY STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 12. The SEC has supported its call for
fair and honest markets through uniform regulation by stating that:
Investors will seek out markets they perceive as fair and honest. Countries that
do not have prohibitions against insider trading, market manipulation, and mis-
representations to the marketplace risk becoming havens for illegal activities.
Market abuses result in less efficient markets, higher insurance and other costs
and, most important, the absence from those markets of individual and institu-
tional investors who consider integrity to be an essential market characteristic.
Id.
29. See Kubler, supra note 5. at 112 (speculating that if the various nations
adopted a uniform set of laws they could eradicate problems caused by inconsistent
regulations).
30. G. Lynch, Address to Financial Times International Conference on Developing
the Global Market for Equities 6 (Oct. 21, 1986) (quoted in Internationalization of the
Securities Markets, supra note 2, at 437 n. 171).
31. See Peters & Feldman, supra note 6, at 33-34 (describing various legislative
initiatives in the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland. It-
aly, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland).
32. Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing. O.J. EtR.
COMM. (No. L 334) 30 (1989) [hereinafter Council Directive].
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II. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. ECONOMIC GOALS OF THE EEC
The occurrence of fraud and insider trading negatively affects the
integrity and efficiency of capital markets. 33 The EEC's desire to curb
this harmful practice is rooted in one of the four "freedoms" spelled
out by the Treaty of Rome 3 4 -the freedom of movement of capital.35
Inherent in the free movement of capital is the establishment of a com-
mon capital market in the Community. 36 In turn, the EEC believes
that interpenetration of the national markets is the most effective way
to achieve this goal.37 Thus, it is clear that if markets afford unequal
protection to investors, investors will withdraw from the markets and
the interpenetration process will be frustrated. 38 As a result of this in-
evitable market decline, it became crucial for the EEC to ensure that
member States observe satisfactory standards of investor protection.30
Because the Treaty of Rome allows the EEC to create certain safe-
guards in the interest of uniformity and protection of each Member
State, 0 in 1987 the Community took its first substantive step towards
equalizing investor protection by adopting a draft directive on insider
33. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text (illustrating the importance of effi-
ciency and integrity in the international markets).
34. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-Il) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958)
(unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
35. Id. at 15-16. Article 3(c) of the Treaty of Rome advances the goal of obtaining
the free movement of capital throughout the Community. Id. The article states that the
Community should actively abolish obstacles to free movement for people, money and
service, among Member States. Id.
36. See Cruickshank, supra note 1, at 346 (stating that the creation of a common
capital market is inherent in the "freedom of movement of capital" as set forth in the
Treaty of Rome).
37. Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities, 4 Com-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) § 10,880 (Apr. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Press Release],
38. See Comment, Securities-Insider Trading-The Effects of the New EEC
Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 132 (1988) [herein-
after Comment, New EEC Draft Directive] (discussing the importance of uniform in-
vestor protection in the interpenetration process); POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 19,
at 12 (noting that honest markets will attract investors and dishonest ones will drive
them away).
39. Cruickshank, supra note I, at 346.
40. See Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the Euro-
pean Community, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293, 296 (1982) (explaining the use of
safeguards to foster protection of the member-states' interests). The relevant sections of
the Treaty of Rome are arts. 83-130, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-66.
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trading.4 It finalized this initiative on November 13, 1989, by adopting
the Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing (the
Directive) .42
EEC involvement in insider trading regulation stems from the reali-
zation that insider trading is a real and growing problem. The chronic
phenomenon of significant price movement in stock prices prior to ma-
jor corporate developments best indicates the insider trading problem."3
Furthermore, the national markets are becoming increasingly interna-
tionalized, and the insider trading regulations of each of the twelve
Member States are inconsistent.4' In order to meet the goals set forth
in the Single European Act,'4 5 which include the formation of a large
and integrated market by 1992,46 it is clear that the EEC will have to
overcome those obstacles which threaten the smooth operation of the
national securities markets.'
41. Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading,
10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 153) 8 (1987) [hereinafter Draft Directive].
42. Council Directive, supra note 32.
43. See Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An Interna-
tional Analysis, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 335, 336 (1982) (suggesting that such
price movement is indicative of the deficiencies in laws governing insider trading and
enforcement).
44. See supra notes 5-17, 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing the internation-
alization process and the inconsistency of national legislation in the Member States).
45. Single European Act, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter Sin-
gle European Act], amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community.
46. Id. The Single European Act states, in relevant part:
Article 130a
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and
social cohesion.
In particular the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the
various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions.
Article 130b
Member States shall conduct their economic policies, and shall coordinate
them, in such a way as, in addition, to attain the objectives set out in Article
130a. The implementation of the common policies of the internal market shall
take into account the objectives set out in Article 130a and in 130c and shall
contribute to their achievement.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
47. See Fornasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 149
(1989-1990) (stating that insider trading is a problem that the EEC must correct in
order to bring about proper functioning of the market). The author also suggests that
recent insider trading cases and scandals have taken on political consequence and have
thus added to the need for a quick and uniform solution to the problem. Id. at 149-50.
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B. THE COMPANY LAW HARMONIZATION PROGRAM AND THE
DIRECTIVE PROCESS
A central aspect of the Treaty of Rome combines the goal of free
movement of persons, services, and capital among the Member States
into what is termed "the right of establishment."48 This right includes
the right of a national company of one Member State to conduct busi-
ness in any other Member State."9 To provide for more effective reali-
zation of this goal, the Treaty of Rome grants the EEC the power to
create equivalent protective safeguards among the Member States.50 To
this end, the EEC encourages Member States to harmonize legislation
in order to reduce high levels of risk to shareholders and potential
investors.5 1
The Treaty of Rome grants the European Community Council of
Ministers the power to issue directives to the Member States. " The
Community employs EEC directives to harmonize the laws of the
Member States, by forcing them to adopt national legislation consistent
with the directive.5 3 The Council established a directive in an effort to
48. See Schneebaum, supra note 40, at 295-96 (explaining the elements of the
"right of establishment").
49. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 52.
50. Id. art. 54, para. 3(g).
51. See Schneebaum, supra note 40, at 296 (discussing investor protection through
harmonization).
52. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 54(2). The Treaty of Rome states that:
In order to implement the general programme, or if no such programme exists,
to complete one stage towards the achievement of freedom of establishment for a
specific activity, the Council, on a proposal of the Commission and after the
Economic and Social Committee and the [Parliament] have been consulted,
shall, until the end of the first stage by means of a unanimous vote and subse-
quently by means of a qualified majority vote, act by issuing directives.
Id.
53. Schneebaum, supra note 40, at 296. The directive is binding "as to the result to
be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 189.
The Treaty of Rome affords the Commission the authority to introduce a new propo-
sal. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 54(2). Once a proposal is introduced, the
Commission appoints a "working party" to study it and make appropriate recommen-
dations. II.A INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION at Dir. 20-22 (1982)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION). Following this process, which can take
several years, the Commission drafts a version of the proposal and sends it to the Coun-
cil. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 54(2). According to the Treaty of Rome,
before the Council can act on the proposal, it must consult with the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee. Id. at 193-98. The European Parlia-
ment consists of representatives from each Member State. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION, supra. Unlike the members of the Council, Parliament members do not represent
a particular Member State's national government. Id. The European Parliament's pri-
mary purpose is to issue advisory opinions to the Council. Id. Essentially, the Economic
and Social Committee acts in an advisory capacity. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34,
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bring the Member States' insider trading regulations of the Member
States into conformity.
C. HISTORY OF THE DIRECTIVE ON INSIDER TRADING
The 1977 European Code of Conduct was the EEC's first effort to
address insider trading. 4 This voluntary code provided that any person
in possession of privileged or price sensitive information while acting
within the scope of his or her employment should refrain from dealing
in that particular security or disclosing price sensitive information."
The Code was an early attempt to address insider trading. The actual
Directive process began in 1982, however, when the Commission as-
sembled a group of experts to determine the need for establishing fur-
ther regulation of the securities markets of the EEC Member States. 8
The experts believed that interpenetration of the capital markets re-
quired at least minimum standards of uniform investor protection." In-
sider trading regulations, therefore, were a necessary element of any
effective protective measures. 5
On April 28, 1987, the Commission adopted the Proposal for a
Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading (Draft
art. 54(2). The Committee represents workers, employees, and consumer interests. Id.
The Economic and Social Committee receives the proposal only if it involves economic
concerns. Id. Once the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
evaluates the proposal, if there are any additional proposals or changes, the Commis-
sion must consider them. Schneebaum, supra note 40, at 297.
The Council of Ministers is responsible for the next and final mediation phase, gen-
erally consisting of three stages. Id. at 298. The first level is basically a 'working
party" of specialists. New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 131. As representa-
tives of the various ministries of the Member States, the Council of Ministers reviews
the elements of the proposal and attempts to overcome technical hurdles to the Coun-
cil's final adaptation. Schneebaum, supra note 40, at 298. Second. the Committee of
Permanent Representatives, which consists of members of ambassadorial standing from
each of the Member States, considers the political ramifications of the proposal. Id.
Finally, the Foreign Ministers of each of the Member States, the Council of Ministers,
considers the proposal put before it, and has the power to adopt the Directive and to
give it full legal effect. Treaty of Rome, supra note 34, art. 100a.
54. European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securi-
ties, O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 212) 41 (1977).
55. Id. See generally B. RIDER & H. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING 268-71 (1979) (discussing the Code of Conduct).
56. See Cruickshank, supra note I, at 346 (discussing the state of insider regula-
tions in 1982). At this time the Commission was evaluating to what extent it should
initiate further programs through the directive procedure. At that time, the Council
adopted three directives relating to stock exchange issues. Id.
57. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the interpenetration pro-
cess and the need for uniform investor protection).
58. Cohen, Toward an International Securities Market, 5 LAW & POL'v lTr'L
Bus. 357, 390 (1973).
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Directive)."" The Commission submitted the Draft Directive to the
Council on May 25, 1987.60 Remarkably, only twenty-nine months
later, the Council adopted the Directive."'
D. THE INSIDER TRADING DIRECTIVE
1. Goals of the Directive
The legislative intent of the EEC Insider Trading Directive illus-
trates some of the goals of the directive. As the debates and various
committee reports that take place during the course of EEC legislation
are not part of the public record, the history of EEC legislation cannot
be analyzed in the same way as legislative history in the United States.
The preamble of the Directive, however, enumerates the economic
goals the Council sought to realize by adopting this particular
legislation. 62
The creation and smooth functioning of the internal market in the
EEC is the primary aim of the insider trading directive.63 Through the
Directive, the Council, using its authority under Article 100a of the
Treaty of Rome,64 sought to promote investor confidence and protection
and the successful interpenetration of the national markets."0 The
59. Draft Directive, supra note 41.
60. Id.
61. Council Directive, supra note 32. Many consider the 29 month adoption period
to be comparatively short when measured against other Community legislative initia-
tives. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 152 (stating that the 29 month adoption period
is considered short by EEC legislative standards).
The relative ease with which the directive moved through the EEC legislative process
strongly indicates that the Member States recognize the importance of uniform market
regulation. The EEC may, therefore, implement the Directive rather quickly and en-
force it more stringently than other EEC stock market initiatives.
62. Council Directive, supra note 32, preamble.
63. Id. The preamble of the Directive states:
Whereas Article 100a (1) of the Treaty [of Rome] states that the Council shall adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment
and functioning of the internal market. Id.
64. Id.
65. Council Directive, supra note 32, preamble. An additional section of the Direc-
tive's preamble states in relevant part:
Whereas the secondary market in transferable securities plays an important role
in the financing of economic agents;
Whereas, for that market to be able to play its role effectively, every measure
should be taken to ensure that market operates smoothly;
Whereas, the smooth operation of that market depends to a large extent on the
confidence it inspires in investors;
Whereas the factors on which such confidence depends include the assurance
afforded to investors that they are placed on an equal footing and that they will
be protected against the improper use of inside information;
[VOL. 6:637
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Council believed that it could not accomplish the smooth functioning of
the internal markets without uniform regulation of insider trading."0
The Council's Statement to the Parliament contained in the
Amended Proposal demonstrates a second policy consideration behind
the adoption of the Directive.67 In this statement, the Council clearly
articulated the goals of insider trading regulation. 8 These aims entail
balancing supply and demand with equal opportunity for all investors
by prohibiting individuals with inside information from taking advan-
tage of this information at the expense of other market players. 9 Addi-
tionally, the Council stated that the attempt to reach a uniform level of
investor protection stemmed from the significant differences in the ways
that those Member States which regulate insider trading approach the
issue, and from the fact that several Member States do not regulate
insider trading at all.70 The ultimate goal of the Directive, therefore, is
to harmonize the insider trading provisions of the Member States and
provide a uniform level of protection to capital market investors.7 1
2. The Directive's Definitions and Scope
The Directive, as with most laws dealing with insider trading, con-
tains two central definitions: "inside information" and "insider." 72 It
Whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with others, insider dealing
is likely to undermine that confidence and may therefore prejudice the smooth
operation of the market;
Whereas the necessary measures should therefore be taken to combat insider
dealing;
Whereas in some Member States there are no rules or regulations prohibiting
insider dealing and whereas the rules or regulations that do exist differ consider-
ably from one Member State to another;
Whereas it is therefore advisable to adopt coordinated rules at a Community
level in this field;
Whereas such coordinated rules also have the advantage of making it possible,
through cooperation by the competent authorities, to combat transfrontier insider
dealing more effectively ....
Id.
66. Id.
67. Fornasier, supra note 47, at 150 n.5 (citing Common Position Adopted by the
Council on July 18, 1989 with a View to the Adoption of a Directive Coordinating
Regulations on Insider Dealing, EUR. PARL. Sass. Docs., ser. C. doc. C 3-0018/89
(July 28, 1989) [hereinafter Amended Proposal]).
68. Id.
69. Id., Amended Proposal, at 2-3.
70. Id.
71. Supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection of mar-
ket investors).
72. Council Directive, supra note 32, arts. I & 2.
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defines inside information broadly.73 While incorporating the British
and West German definitions, 4 the Directive sets forth four elements
that describe "inside" information. These elements are: 1) non-public
information; 2) relating to issuers or issues of transferable securities; 3)
likely to have a material effect on the price of the security if published;
4) of an exact nature.7 5 Although parts of the Directive's definition of
inside information may be susceptible to judicial interpretation, 8 one
can speculate that it will gain acceptance throughout the Community
because the Directive draws from the language of the British and West
German insider trading regulations77 and is also similar to the French
insider trading provisions. 8
The definition of "insider," like the definition of inside information,
has a broad scope. 9 Most significantly, the definition includes both
"primary" and "secondary" insiders.80 The Council thus chose the
73. See New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 136 (demonstrating the
breadth of the Directive's definition of insider trading); Note, Toward the Unification,
supra note 11, at 448 (describing the Directive's definition as thorough).
74. See New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 136 (noting that the EEC
definition of inside information coincides with the definition in the United Kingdom
and West Germany).
75. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 1. The Directive provides in relevant
part:
1. "inside information" shall mean information which has not been made public
of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or
to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or se-
curities in question ....
Id.
76. See New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 136 (stating that certain
words such as "unknown" and "material" may be subject to judicial interpretation).
77. Id.
78. See Comment, Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of the Insider
Trading Laws of the Member States, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 151, 174 (1985)
[hereinafter Comment, Harmonization of the Member States] (stating that the Direc-
tive's definition of inside information is similar in some respects to the French
definition).
79. See Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 133 (stating that
the definition of insider is broad and all-encompassing); Note, Toward the Unification,
supra note 11, at 448 (stating that the broad definition of insider is one of the Direc-
tive's strongest assets).
80. Council Directive, supra note 32, arts. 2, 1, 4. The Directive provides, in
relevant part:
Article 2
1. Each Member State shall prohibit any person who:
-by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer,
-by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or
-because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his em-
ployment, profession or duties, possesses inside information from taking advan-
tage of that information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or dispos-
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broadest commonly accepted definition of insider, including the "com-
pany professional" (tipper) and the person who knowingly uses the
privileged information (tippee).81 This choice of definitions is impor-
tant, for if the EEC truly seeks to eradicate the practice of insider trad-
ing, it should prohibit anyone with privileged information from trading
on that knowledge. This expansive definition of insider ensures inves-
tors' confidence in the securities market.82 Finally, the language of the
Directive does not lend itself to legislative or judicial manipulation. The
Directive provides adequately specific boundaries to prevent individual
Member States or the courts from altering the definitional scope or
intent.8 3
Aside from the definitions of insider and inside information, addi-
tional restrictive components of the Directive further explicate the
scope of the Directive. The first and most widely recognized restriction
is that any person whom the Directive covers may not trade any trans-
ferable security84 on a national market within the territory of a particu-
ing of for his own account or for the account of a third party, either directly or
indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that informa-
tion relates.
Article 4
Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided for in Article 2 on
any person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge
of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which
could not be other than a person referred to in Article 2.
Id.
81. See Cruickshank, supra note 1, at 346-47 (delineating three definitional alter-
natives for insider available to the law makers); see also Note, Toward the Unification,
supra note 11, at 448 (stating that a narrower approach would have left out the tip-
pees, and that effective legislation would have to include any person who knowingly
trades on the basis of privileged information); Comment, New EEC Draft Directive,
supra note 38, at 133 (applauding the definition for its breadth and specificity).
Only the United Kingdom employed this inclusive definition of insider, which in-
cludes both tippers and tippees. At least one commentator believes such a definition is
too expansive because it creates the possibility of an endless chain of insiders. Cruick-
shank, supra note 1, at 347.
82. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 448 (stressing the impor-
tance of involving the tippee in the Directive's definition of insider as opposed to merely
including the fiduciaries of the company in question).
83. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 163-64 (arguing that the Council definition of
insider trading is so stringent that each Member State will have to implement uniform
definitions). But see New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 133-34 n.1 10 (argu-
ing that there are some words, such as "professional," "duties," and "in the exercise
of" which might undergo judicial interpretation that would alter the meaning of
insider).
84. See Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 1(2) (defining transferable securi-
ties). Transferable securities include shares, debt securities. contracts or rights to sub-
scribe, acquire, or dispose of securities, index contracts, and futures. ld
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lar Member State.85 Second, it is important to note that just as the
Directive prevents a person from dealing on the basis of inside informa-
tion, a company or legal person is prohibited from such transactions.80
Third, the Directive does not prevent tippees from disclosing privileged
information to third parties.87 Finally, the prohibitions against insider
dealing apply to transactions carried out through a professional inter-
mediary, such as a bank, holding company, or stock-broker.88
3. Implementation
One of the unique features of a Council Directive is its adaptability.
Once the Council passes a Directive, the Member States usually have a
two year period in which to bring their national legislation into con-
formity with its provisions.89 Thus, a Directive is not a per se "binding
instrument." 90 In keeping with this distinctive method of legislation,
the insider trading Directive provides that each Member State must
comply with its requirements on or before June 1, 1992.91 This obli-
gates each Member State to inform the Commission when the appro-
priate measures have been taken and what provisions their individual
national legislatures have adopted. 92
85. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 5. Article 5 of the Directive applies only
to issues and issuers dealing in transferable securities within the territory of the Mem-
ber State. Id. The Directive, however, does not regulate transactions that take place
outside the territory of a particular national exchange. New EEC Draft Directive,
supra note 38, at 137. While this limitation may seem contrary to the notion of pro-
moting Community wide investor protection, to the extent that not all Member States
are in agreement regarding how far reaching the prohibitions should be, Article 5 may
represent a compromise position. Id. at 138. It is important to understand that with all
of the provisions set forth, a Member State may adopt more stringent rules, thus deter-
mining whether or not it wishes to extend regulation over markets outside of its terri-
tory. Fornasier, supra note 47, at 164-65.
86. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 2 (2).
87. One can derive this interpretation from Article 6, which allows a Member State
to extend its national laws to include prohibitions against tippees disclosing insider in-
formation. See Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 138 (explaining
how the Directive focuses on the tipper, not the tippee).
88. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 2(3). A Member State, however, may
suspend the prohibition against the use of insider information in cases dealing outside
of the national market, not carried out through a professional intermediary. Id.
89. See Cruickshank, supra note 1, at 345 (stating that directives are flexible be-
cause the national authorities are free to choose their own method of implementation);
see also Fornasier, supra note 47, at 162 (stating that Member States are able to
choose the legal means to attain a directive's goal); Comment, New EEC Draft Direc-
tive, supra note 38, at 130 (stating that a directive is not binding as to the implementa-
tion of the means, but only as to the result in achieving its stated goal).
90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility and pur-
poses of the Directive's implementation scheme).
91. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 14.
92. Id.
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In order to give additional credence to the requirements of a council
directive, the Court of Justice strictly interprets the term implementa-
tion."3 As such, de facto compliance with the Directive provisions is
insufficient." A Member State must expressly bring its national legisla-
tion into compliance with the Directive.95 While the United Kingdom,
France, and Denmark have criminal statutes prohibiting insider trad-
ing, the other Member States, including Germany, do not.00 This dis-
parity suggests that most Member States will have to significantly alter
their historical approach to insider trading by adopting an entirely new
set of laws.
4. Enforcement
Perhaps the most important, and certainly some of the most contro-
versial aspects of the insider trading directive are its enforcement provi-
sions."7 The Directive addresses enforcement on several fronts. The first
is the stringency with which each Member State must conform to the
various regulations.9 8 According to the Directive, each Member State
must adopt national legislation at least as stringent as that provided in
the Directive.99 A Member State may, however, adopt more stringent
provisions, and extend the scope of the Directive to include prohibitions
against a tippee trading on insider information.100
The second major enforcement issue that the Directive addresses is
the administration of a Member State's insider trading prohibitions.11
To this end, the Directive simply requires that each Member State des-
ignate an administrative authority which will be responsible for ensur-
93. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 165 (stating that the Court requires Member
States to strictly conform national legislation with Community law).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (illustrating that only these three
Member States have criminal insider trading regulations).
97. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 449 (stating that the ma-
jor weakness in the Directive is its enforcement provisions).
98. See id. (explaining that one of the basic policy reasons of the Directive is assur-
ing equal protection in each Member State).
99. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 6. Article 6 provides in relevant part:
"Each Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than those laid down by this
Directive or additional provisions, provided that such provisions are applied generally."
Id.
100. Id. Article 6 further provides: "In particular [a Member State) may extend
the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 2 and impose on persons referred to in
Article 4 the prohibitions laid down in Article 3." Id.
101. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note I1, at 449 (recognizing that the
Directive fails to establish guidelines to ensure uniform administration).
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ing compliance with its insider trading laws.102 This authority must be
given the investigatory and supervisory prerogative to carry out its reg-
ulatory purpose.'03 Furthermore, each country bears the responsibility
for informing every Member State which agency will be regulating in-
sider trading, and endowing its regulatory bureau with the power to
cooperate with authorities.1 0 4
Inter-EEC cooperation in the regulation of insider trading is the pri-
mary function of the Council Directive. This cooperation is, therefore,
a critical element in controlling the relatively new phenomenon of
transnational insider trading. 03 As a result, each Member State must
endow its designated national authority with the power to investigate
and manage suspected insider trading violations in cooperation with
other national authorities."' Several important issues which require
careful consideration are apparent. If the exchange of information
might compromise the "sovereignty, security, or public policy"'1 7 of the
state receiving a request, for example, then that state's authority may
refuse to act on a request.'08 A state's authority may also refuse a re-
quest if the party who is the subject of the investigation has previously
participated in judicial proceedings on the same action in the state re-
ceiving the request.10 9 Finally, to facilitate mutual cooperation, a re-
questing state may forward information it receives to other Member
States, if the state that supplied the information consents. 110
102. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 8, (1)(2). The Directive provides that:
I. Each Member State shall designate the administrative authority or authorities
competent, if necessary in collaboration with other authorities to ensure that the
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive are applied. It shall so inform the
Commission which shall transmit that information to all Member States.
2. The competent authorities must be given all supervisory and investigatory
powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions, where appropriate
in collaboration with other authorities.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See European Community Commission Proposes Ban on Insider Trading, 19
SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 636 (1987) (stating that the Directive's proposed informa-
tion exchange system serves an important role in the effort to curb insider trading
across the EEC's national borders); see also Comment, New EEC Draft Directive,
supra note 38, at 139 (relating the relevant provisions of the Directive to the cases of
insider trading crossing national boundaries).
106. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 10(1). The Directive mandates that pre-
sent and former enforcement officials maintain professional secrecy when dealing with
the transnational exchange of information. Id.
107. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 10(2)(a).
108. Id.
109. Id. at art. 10(2)(b).
I10. Id. at art. 10(3).
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To further enhance cooperation, the Directive provides for the estab-
lishment of a "contact committee" at the Community level to function
as a working body charged with exchanging information among Mem-
ber States, and suggesting regulatory changes."' By providing for both
the contact committee-a standing committee that has experience
working together" 2-and the provisions spelled out in Article 8, which
will help make the exchange of information less formal,' 3 the Directive
may achieve the uniform level of regulation that it seeks to create.
In terms of the "external competence" of the Community in dealing
with international enforcement of the Directive, Article 11 provides
that, "[t]he Community may, in conformity with the Treaty, conclude
agreements with non-member countries on the matters governed by this
Directive."" 4 While this statement appears fairly straightforward,
some commentators speculate on the legal effect of Article I 1 with pes-
simism.115 They base their reservations on the fact that EEC institu-
tions cannot confer competence on the Community in the field of inter-
national law.1 6 Because the Directive derives its authority from Article
100a of the Treaty of Rome,"17 analysts should interpret Article I 1 to
allow Member States to conclude international agreements on their
own, as long as the agreements do not compromise the Directive's pro-
visions or future developments in Community law. 1 8 Although Article
11 may merely represent a policy initiative, 19 it illustrates that the
EEC is aware of the need for insider trading enforcement on an inter-
national level.
111. Id. at art. 12. The Council first created contact committees to facilitate imple-
mentation of the Directive. Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 437 n.32.
Representatives of the Commission and other persons appointed by the Member States
comprise these committees. id. at 437-38.
112. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 170 (noting that the standing committee
members are accustomed to working together).
113. See id. at 168-69 (stating that by giving the authorities appointed by the
Member States a role that is more administrative than judicial, the provisions promote
an informal atmosphere which may create a smooth network of powerful national regu-
latory authorities).
114. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 11.
115. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 174 (speculating that Article II is merely a
general policy statement with no real legal impact).
116. Id. at 171.
117. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the
power of the Treaty of Rome).
118. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 172 (concluding that analysts cannot inter-
pret Article 11 to confer competence on the Community in matters of foreign affairs
and that individual Member States may conclude international agreements on their
own).
119. See id. at 174 (asserting that Article 11 may simply be a policy statement
devoid of legal significance).
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5. Sanctions/Penalties
While the exchange of information and mutual cooperation stan-
dards that the Directive envisions represent a substantial step toward
uniform regulation of insider trading, the manner in which the Direc-
tive approaches the application of sanctions to violators is a source of
considerable speculation.120 The Directive allows each Member State to
determine its own penalties.1 2' Many consider this a matter of principle
in formulating Community law, as the Commission considers penal
sanctions the exclusive domain of each individual Member State.12 As
a result, however, it is possible that one state would implement both
criminal and civil sanctions, while others would choose one of the two
penalties. 23  This inconsistency between sanctions threatens EEC
harmonization. 24
An analysis of the prospects for the Directive's success or failure
should consider past treatment of insider trading in individual Member
States. Two Member States (the United Kingdom and Germany) have
approached insider trading from substantially different angles. An ex-
amination of insider trading regulations in these countries may illus-
trate the prospects for success on a Community-wide basis for two rea-
sons. First, because the regulatory provisions in the United Kingdom
served as a model for the creation of the EEC Directive, those coun-
tries which must now implement a regulatory scheme may learn from
the various successes and failures of the British system. Second, be-
cause Germany does not statutorily regulate insider trading, and be-
cause its markets are similar to those of the seven Member States that
have not dealt with the problem, Germany's treatment and philosophi-
120. See id. at 167 (speculating that the differences in sanctions among Member
States may jeopardize the Directive's aim of integrating the national markets).
121. See Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 13. (providing that "[ejach Mem-
ber State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures
taken pursuant to this Directive ... [and] [tihe penalties shall be sufficient to promote
compliance with those measures").
122. See Nieuwdorp, supra note 22, at 42-43 (stating that each Member State
exercises control over penal law).
123. See id. at 43 (explaining that Member States have a choice of penalties).
124. See Fornasier, supra note 47, at 167 (stating that while all Member States
define insider trading consistently, each state may treat this activity differently in terms
of legal qualifications and sanctions); see also Comment, New EEC Draft Directive,
supra note 38, at 139 (asserting that the Directive will not achieve harmonization until
it consistently applies sanctions throughout the Community). But see Fornasier, supra
note 47, at 167 (noting that Article 13 does provide that sanctions must be stiff enough
to force compliance, and that the Commission as well as the Court of Justice may
review a state's penal provisions and bring them into conformity with the Directive's
aims).
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cal approach to insider trading may influence the way that many of the
Member States treat the new Directive.
III. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN GREAT
BRITAIN
A. HISTORICAL TREATMENT
The United Kingdom has faced the insider trading issue since the
early 20th century.125 Because the United Kingdom is a common law
state, the British courts promulgate regulations. In the landmark case
of Percival v. Wright, 28 the United Kingdom's Court of Chancery ad-
dressed the fiduciary relationship that exists among the corporation's
directors, the corporate entity, and its shareholders. The court held that
while corporate directors do have a fiduciary relationship with the cor-
porate entity, they do not have such a relationship with its sharehold-
ers. 27 Therefore, investors may not bring an insider trading claim
against a company's directors. 28 While Percival did establish the right
of a corporation to sue its directors, very few corporations have taken
advantage of this due to their reluctance to sue colleagues. '1  While
some investors have attempted to redress their grievances through al-
ternative causes of action, such as breach of confidence, duty to dis-
close, and unjust enrichment, the courts have applied these theories
narrowly, and most plaintiffs have had little success in attaining ade-
quate remedies.1 30
The United Kingdom also utilizes a self-regulatory approach to in-
sider trading. London's financial center, "the City," is comprised of a
closely knit group which has traditionally governed its own activities.1 3'
The custom of self-regulation stems from the fear that if unabated in-
sider trading occurs, the government will impose regulatory measures
against the practice. 32 Two United Kingdom institutions have tradi-
125. See Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421, 426-27 (1902) (dismissing an action
against a corporation's directors accused of insider trading).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 425-26.
128. Id.
129. See Rider, supra note 55, at 155 (stating that often the insider is an upper-
level manager or director, and his associates are reluctant to sue).
130. See id. at 158-60 (discussing judicial solutions to insider trading claims and
their ultimate failure).
131. See Comment, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws and Problems
of Enforcement in Great Britain, 12 B.C. INT'L & Coip. L.R. 265. 268 (1989) [here-
inafter Comment, Recent Developments] (stating that the City has historically regu-
lated itself absent significant government intervention).
132. Rider, supra note 55, at 160.
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tionally regulated insider trading, the City Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers1 " and the Council for the Securities Industry.13
The City Panel promulgates a professional code of regulations re-
garding commercial conduct during takeovers and mergers-the City
Code. 13 5 The Code applies to any company listed on the stock ex-
change. 3 ' It prohibits employees who have "confidential price sensitive
information," and who work for a company engaged in a merger or
takeover, except the offeror, from dealing in the stock of the companies
involved.' 3 7 The Code also prevents employees under its prohibitions
from counseling or advising a third party with respect to purchasing
the target securities. 138 While the City Panel can regulate insider trad-
ing during takeovers and mergers through the City Code, it cannot ad-
dress the issue in other contexts. 139 Whereas the City Panel issues and
enforces regulations, the Council for the Securities Industry's primary
function is to examine and recommend solutions to insider trading
problems. 40
Although there has been significant statutory regulation of insider
trading over the last ten years, both the City Panel and the Council of
Securities Industry continue to operate in a watchdog capacity.' In
order to assist the City's self-regulatory measures, 4 1 Parliament, in
1980, made insider trading a statutory violation in the United King-
133. Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 270. The United King-
dom's financial services industry established the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
in 1968, following almost two decades of insider trading abuse. Id. Representatives
from the financial services industry, including members of the Council of the Stock
Exchange, the Exchange's governing body, as well as bankers, stock brokers, and insur-
ance professionals compose the panel. Id. See generally Rider, supra note 55, at 160-61
(discussing the City Panel and its development).
134. Wallace, Who is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading: A Com-
parative Study of American, British, and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 217, 235
(1985). Financial services industry professionals compose the Council for the Securities
Industry, established in 1978. Id.
135. A. JOHNSON, CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 158-59 (1980).
136. See Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 124 (stating that
a company is not bound by the Code unless it wishes to trade on the national stock
exchange).
137. See Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 270 (discussing the
City Code's prohibitions).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 271.
140. See Wallace, supra note 134, at 235 (discussing the role of the Council for the
Securities Industry).
141. See Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 124 (stating that
statutory regulation has amplified the role these institutions play in securities
regulation).
142. See id. (explaining that the United Kingdom promoted statutory regulation,
not because self-regulation failed, but rather to reinforce self-regulation by providing
harsher sanctions).
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dom. 143 Parliament consolidated the insider trading provisions of the
Companies Act of 1980, combined them with other company law regu-
lations,'. and in 1985 adopted the Company Securities Insider Dealing
Act (Insider Act). 145 By providing for criminal sanctions against per-
sons convicted of insider trading, the Insider Act strengthened the reg-
ulatory authorities' powers.146 In 1986, Parliament passed the Financial
Services Act (Financial Act), 47 again increasing the investigatory pow-
ers of securities regulators. 48 Importantly, the Financial Services Act
added civil penalties to the list of available insider trading sanctions. 40
Notwithstanding the additional insider trading provisions of the Finan-
cial Services Act, the Insider Act serves as the principal law regulating
insider trading in the United Kingdom.'
B. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE INSIDER ACT
As in the EEC Council Directive, the definitions of "inside informa-
tion" and "insider" provide significant insight into the scope of the
British insider trading regulations. Three important elements exist in
the definition of inside information in the Insider Act.15' First, the Act
prohibits an insider from dealing securities on a recognized stock ex-
change if the person obtains information through a connection with a
143. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22.
144. See Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 276 (discussing the
enactment of the 1985 Insider Act); see also Banoff, The Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing in the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'V. LEGAL
STUD. 145, 154 (1987) (discussing the re-enactment of the 1980 Companies Act as the
1985 Insider Act).
145. Company Securities Insider Dealing Act, 1985, ch. 8 [hereinafter Insider
Act].
146. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note 11, at 438-39 (discussing the
impact of the Insider Act on regulatory authorities).
147. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60 [hereinafter Financial Act].
148. Id. at § 173-78.
149. Id. at § 62.
150. See Houle, Survey of National Legislation Regulating Insider Trading, 9
MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 209, 211 (1987) (noting the importance of the Insider
Act in addressing the United Kingdom's insider trading problem).
151. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 10. The Insider Act defines inside informa-
tion as:
Any reference in this Act to unpublished price-sensitive information in relation
to any securities of a company is a reference to information which-
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or indirectly) to
that company, that is to say, is not of a general nature relating or of concern to
that company, and
(b) is not generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would be
likely to deal in those securities but which would if it were generally known to
them be likely materially to affect the price of those securities.
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corporation that would otherwise be unavailable to persons dealing in
securities.1 52 Second, the information regarding a particular company
or security must be specific in nature.153 Finally, the information must
be likely to materially affect the price of the security if the corporation
published the information.'
The Insider Act employs a broad definition of "insider" that includes
"primary" and "secondary" insiders.' 55 The Act has a wide scope and
is the most inclusive insider trading legislation in Europe.15 The heart
of the insider prohibitions can be found in Section (1) of the Act-its
statutory definition of insider. 5" A primary insider under the Act's def-
inition is a fiduciary of the entity issuing the target security. 58 The
"insider" must be "knowingly connected" with the issuer or associated
with the company during the prior six months.' 59 "Connected" persons
include all directors, and other persons who occupy a position reasona-
bly expected to provide access to the privileged information and reason-
ably expected not to disclose such information, unless acting within
their scope of employment. 6 ' The Act also covers temporary insiders, a
152. Id. at § 10(b). Note that the extent to which the information is unavailable to
people dealing in the market is uncertain. Banoff, supra note 144, at 156. It does not
appear that the information has to be available to the general public. Id.
153. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 10(a). The meaning of the word specific is
an unresolved issue. At least one commentator defines it to include mergers, acquisi-
tions, major business decisions, dividend payments, changes in capital structure or in-
vestment, and divestitures. Banoff, supra note 144, at 157 (citing J.H. FARRAR, COM-
PANY LAW 356 (1985)).
154. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 10(b). The information must be likely to
affect the actual price of the security, not just play an important role in the trading
decisions of third parties. Banoff, supra note 144, at 156.
155. See Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 1 (1) - (4)(prohibiting different types of
conduct for different categories of insiders).
156. See Harmonization of the Member States, supra note 78, at 169 (discussing
the scope of the Insider Act).
157. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § I. The Insider Act provides in full:
(1) Subject to section 3, an individual who is or at any time in the preceding 6
months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a recog-
nized stock exchange in securities of that company if he has information which-
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company,
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected, and in the position
by virtue of which he is so connected, not to disclose except for the proper per-
formance of the functions attaching to that position, and
(c) he knows is unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to those
securities.
id.
158. See Banoff, supra note 144, at 141 (stating that "all insiders are fiduciaries,
but not all fiduciaries are insiders").
159. Insider Act, supra note 145, § 1(1).
160. Banoff, supra note 144, at 155. The definition of a "connected" person in-
cludes those employees who have access to inside information and who would be ex-
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second group of primary insiders who are not permanent employees of
the company.' 6'
A major difference between the Insider Act and the EEC Directive is
that the British Act covers individuals, not corporations., 2 The United
Kingdom will, therefore, have to amend its laws in order to bring them
into conformity with the Directive. This should not pose a significant
problem, however, for as the Insider Act illustrates, the United King-
dom already embraces a broad definition of "insider."'16 3
The second major group of people covered under the Insider Act are
secondary insiders, or tippees.16 1 A tippee is generally defined as one
who "knowingly"16 5 receives his insider information from a "con-
nected" person.16 6 The inclusion of secondary insiders in the insider
trading prohibitions makes the British Act the broadest European in-
sider trading law. 16 7
One major caveat in the insider definition is its scienter require-
ment.1 68 As the Act contains criminal provisions, there is a mens rea
element. 69 To sustain a conviction for insider trading, the Act requires
the suspected insider to be knowingly connected with the corporate en-
pected not to reveal that information except when acting within the scope of their em-
ployment. Id.
161. Insider Act, supra note 145, § 9. A temporary insider engages in a profes-
sional relationship with the issuer, or the companies that have such a relationship em-
ploy temporary insiders. Banoff, supra note 144. at 155. As with the insider, this type
of fiduciary reasonably is expected to be privy to the inside information and not disclose
it, except in the performance of his or her duties. Id. This type of insider includes
lawyers, accountants, auditors, or stock brokers. Comment, Recent Developments,
supra note 131, at 277.
162. See Banoff, supra note 144. at 155 (stating that while the Act does not ex-
pressly cover corporations, authorities may regard them as aiders and abettors).
163. Id.
164. See Insider Act, supra note 145, § 1(3) - (4)(prohibiting certain types of
conduct).
165. Banoff, supra note 144, at 156. An important aspect of this provision deals
with the term knowingly. Id. There must be specific knowledge about the security being
issued. Id. Thus, a tipper's mere advice to trade, without more specificity, does not fall
under the Act. Id.
166. Id. Under this portion of the Act, a connected person is one whom the tippee
has reason to believe received the information due to his position; reasonably expected
that one in the tipper's position would not disclose the information: and has good cause
to believe that the information is "price sensitive." Id.
167. See Comment, Harmonization of the Member States, supra note 78, at 170
(stating that by including tippees, the British insider laws are more inclusive than the
West German or the French laws); see also Cruickshank. supra note 1, at 346-47
(commenting that the United Kingdom Insider Act, by including tippes, is the
broadest in Europe).
168. Insider Act, supra note 145, § 1(l) - (3).
169. Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 1 2t One can infer the
mens rea requirement from section 3 of the Insider Act. It provides a defense to insider
trading if there is a lack of profit motive. Id.
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tity,"10 to know that the insider obtained privileged information
through that position, and to know that the information was price-sen-
sitive and non-public. 7 1 This position focuses on secondary insiders, as
the Act will not render them liable unless they knew that an insider
disclosed the information, and that the information was privileged.172
Having set forth the critical definitional elements of the Insider Act,
an analysis of what actions are prohibited under the Act as compared
to the EEC Directive is useful. The British Insider Act prohibits a
broader range of activities than does the EEC.'73 The Directive only
prohibits trading based on the acquisition of inside information. The
British Act, however, prohibits a number of activities, including trad-
ing, 75 tipping, 176 and counseling or procuring.' 1 7 One can be guilty
under the law if he or she tips someone who in turn takes no action
with regard to the target security.'78 Another significant difference be-
tween the Insider Act and the Directive is that one who is in possession
of privileged information may not counsel or procure a tippee if he or
she reasonably believes that the tippee will take advantage of the infor-
mation outside of Great Britain. 179 These differences are crucial. In ex-
amining the effectiveness of the EEC Directive, at least with respect to
170. See Banoff, supra note 144, at 158 (stating that one aspect of the scienter
requirement is knowledge of the corporate connection).
171. Id.
172. See Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 126 (stating that
the scienter requirement applies to both primary and secondary insiders and requires
knowledge of insider and inside information status).
173. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text (comparing the breadth of the
EEC regulations to the breadth of the Insider Act).
174. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 2. Article 2 of the Directive prohibits an
insider from "acquiring" or "disposing" of transferable securities for his, or a third
party's advantage; through, for example, trading. Id. The statute, however, does not
expressly prohibit any other action. Id.
175. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 1.
176. Id. at § 1 (7)-(8). This prohibition essentially prevents a tipper or tippee from
advising someone else to trade if the advisor has reason to believe that the advisee will
either trade or tip again. Banoff, supra note 144, at 158.
177. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 1(7). The counseling and procuring prohibi-
tion is another example of the ways in which United Kingdom insider laws reach a
greater number of potential offenders than the EEC Directive. Counseling and procur-
ing is like tipping, except that the parties exchange no specific information. Banoff,
supra note 144, at 158. A tippee is liable under the Act, but a counselee is not. Id,
Finally, a counselor, in addition to a tipper, is liable under the Act. Insider Act, supra
note 145, at § 1.
178. See Banoff, supra note 144, at 158 (stating that it is a crime for a non-dealing
tipper to disclose inside information to a non-dealing tippee).
179. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 5. Note that section 5 simply takes those
acts prohibited under sections 1 and 2, and applies them to extra-territorial situations.
Houle, supra note 150, at 213. Note that as in sections 1 and 2, the Act also prohibits
one from tipping, counseling, or procuring another who is outside Great Britain. Id.
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the United Kingdom, it is clear that the prohibitions spelled out by the
EEC compliment the existing system in Great Britain because the
scope of the United Kingdom prohibitions is much more
comprehensive. 1 0
C. DEFENSES
While the statutory prohibitions included in the Insider Act are more
stringent than the EEC Directive, the British insider regulations differ
from the EEC Directive in a significant and potentially troublesome
way. The United Kingdom's Insider Act provides six defenses to an
accusation of insider trading,' 8' while the Directive provides no de-
fenses."8 The Insider Act divides defenses into two groups-individual
actions that are not prohibited, and actions that are not prohibited if
the individual acquires information in a particular manner. 83
The first group of defenses applies to persons trading or counseling
for purposes other than making a profit or avoiding a loss, 8 or trading
in good-faith according to fiduciary requirements. 8 ' The second group
is available to professionals who deal on a recognized stock exchange,
acquire their information in the regular course of business, and trade or
counsel in the good-faith practice of their profession.',8 Because of
these defenses, it is apparent that Great Britain and the EEC are in-
consistent in determining permissible use of privileged information.
180. See supra note 167 (discussing the inclusiveness of the British Insider Act).
181. See Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 3 (providing six exceptions to the insider
trading provisions).
182. Council Directive, supra note 32.
183. See Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 3 (dividing the defense offered into two
sections).
184. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 3 (1). Section 3(l) provides that "(1) Sec-
tions 1 and 2 do not prohibit an individual by reason of his having any information
from-(a) doing any particular thing otherwise than with a view to the making of a
profit or the avoidance of a loss (whether for himself or another person) by the use of
that information." Id. at § 3(1)(a). See Comment, Harmonization of the Member
States, supra note 78, at 175 (comparing this provision to the lack of provisions in
France and the United States); Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at
279 (describing these traders as persons exempt from the Insider Act's prohibitions).
185. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 3(1)(b). Section 3 provides that "Sections 1
and 2 do not prohibit an individual by reason of his having any information from-(b)
entering into a transaction in the course of the exercise in good faith of his functions as
liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy .... " Id.
186. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 3(l)(c). Section 3 of the Insider Act pro-
vides in relevant part:
Sections I and 2 do not prohibit an individual by reason of his having any infor-
mation from-
(c) doing any particular thing if the information-
(i) was obtained by him in the course of a business of a jobber in which he was
engaged or employed, and
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Consequently, this may frustrate harmonization of Member State laws
with the EEC Directive.
D. ENFORCEMENT
"It has been repeatedly emphasi[zed] that the Achilles heel of in-
sider trading regulations, not only in Britain but in other jurisdictions
as well, is inadequate enforcement. 111 7 In response to historically inad-
equate enforcement of Great Britain's insider trading laws, 188 Parlia-
ment passed the Financial Services Act of 1986.111 Most significantly,
the Financial Act increases investigatory powers for the discovery of
insider trading.'90 Parliament allocated investigatory powers to the De-
partment of Trade and Industry (DTI),' 9 ' Great Britain's primary se-
curities enforcement agency. According to the Financial Act, if the
Secretary of State suspects an Insider Act violation, the Secretary may
designate DTI employees to investigate the purported violation.19 2
The Financial Act grants the appointed investigators with a broad
range of powers,' including the ability to demand relevant docu-
(ii) was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him to obtain
in the ordinary course of that business, and he does that thing in good faith in
the course of that business.
"Jobber" means an individual, partnership or company dealing in securities on
a recognized stock exchange and recognized by the Council of the Stock Ex-
change as carrying on the business of a jobber.
Id.
The Act does not prohibit a jobber from dealing or taking any other actions with
regard to a particular security if he does it in order to facilitate the completion of a
transaction that was already in progress when the jobber obtained privileged informa-
tion. Id. at § 3(2); see also Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 279-80
(stating that a person can defend an insider trading charge by asserting that he or she
traded on privileged information in order to carry out a transaction).
187. P. Tridimas, The Financial Services Act and the Detection of Insider Trad-
ing, 8 COMPANY LAW. 162, 164 (1987).
188. See id. at 164 (stating that between 1980 and 1987 only seven out of the more
than 100 cases referred by the Stock Exchange to the Department of Trade and Indus-
try led to prosecutions).
189. Financial Act, supra note 147; see Banoff, supra note 144, at 162 (discussing
new powers afforded to the Securities Industry Board by the Financial Securities Act).
190. See Tridimas, supra note 187, at 162 (stating that the most important aspect
of the Act, in terms of insider trading, is the new special investigatory power it cre-
ated); see also Banoff, supra note 144, at 161 (commenting on how the Financial Ser-
vices Act increased the enforcement powers of the Department of Trade and Industry).
191. See Banoff, supra note 144, at 161 (discussing the enforcement powers of the
DTI).
192. Financial Act, supra note 147, at § 177(1).
193. See Tridimas, supra note 187, at 161-62 (discussing some of the investigatory
provisions of the Act).
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ments,194 to force "all assistance" in furthering an investigation,"'e and
to examine persons under oath.196 Finally, to add substance to the new
provisions, the Financial Act provides for the imposition of sanctions on
a non-cooperative party."9 ' After the DTI investigates a suspected in-
sider and concludes that a violation has occurred, it refers the case to
the secretary of state. 9 The secretary of state may then either bring
charges or refer the matter to the director of public prosecutions who
may begin criminal proceedings.199 The Financial Act's enforcement
system complies with Article 8 of the Council Directive, which requires
that each Member State designate a competent authority to ensure ad-
equate enforcement of the state's insider laws.2 0'
E. SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
The sanctions available to deter financial misconduct are the final
element to consider in examining the British enforcement provisions.
Because of the difficulty in identifying injured parties in an insider
trading action, the Insider Act provides only for criminal penalties. 201
A convicted insider may face up to two years imprisonment, or a fine of
an unspecified amount.20 2 Although the Insider Act does not provide
for civil remedies, the Financial Act provides an opportunity for civil
194. Financial Act, supra note 147, at § 177(3). When seeking information from
bankers, the investigators must believe that the customer will be able to give specific
information regarding a suspected violation, and the information must convince the
Secretary of State that disclosure is necessary. Id. at § 177(8).
195. Id. at § 177(3)(c).
196. Id. at § 177(4). Under the Act investigators may use any statement made
during the investigation against the person who is complying with the Act. Id. at §
177(6).
197. Id. at § 178(2). Section 178 of the Act authorizes punishment of a person as if
he was in contempt of court. Id. at § 178(2)(a). The secretary of state can impose
severe penalties on a non-cooperative party. Id. at § 178(2)(b). These sanctions se-
verely restrict a recalcitrant subject's ability to work in the financial services industry.
Id. § 178(3).
198. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 8(2).
199. Id.
200. See Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 8 (declaring that authorities compe-
tent to enforce the insider trading provisions must be given all supervisory and investi-
gative powers necessary for enforcement).
201. See Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 290-91 (stating that
because there are no civil penalties under the Insider Act, an insider is able to keep his
or her profits even if convicted); Houle, supra note 150, at 213 (stating that the Insider
Act provides no civil penalties); see also Banoff, supra note 144, at 162 (stating that
the Insider Act does not contain any civil penalties, but that there are possible civil
remedies under the Financial Services Act).
202. Insider Act, supra note 145, at § 8(a). In Great Britain there is a summaryjudgment conviction system; an insider convicted under this scheme faces a maximum
penalty of six months imprisonment, a fine, or both. Id. at § 8(b).
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actions.2 3 The Securities Industry Board (SIB) suggests that it has
new-found power to seek injunctive relief or force disgorgement
through restitution proceedings under the Financial Act.210 Some com-
mentators, however, suggest that greater civil measures are necessary
in order to effectively combat insider trading.20 5 Specifically, effective
enforcement requires express civil remedies that are not subject to
court interpretation. °6 One commentator suggests that the British gov-
ernment pass laws enabling the DTI, the SIB, or the company whose
shares were traded illegally, to sue the insider directly in order to re-
cover illegally gained profits.20 7 In support of this position, this com-
mentator points to the effectiveness of civil relief in the United States
provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.208
Although the British provisions appear to be in compliance with the
goals and regulations of the Council Directive, it is unclear how effec-
tive they will be in light of past enforcement records. For example,
from 1980-1987 the DTI investigated over one hundred cases referred
by the stock exchange.2 09 Only ten prosecutions and seven convictions
203. See Note, Toward the Unification, supra note I1, at 440 (stating that the
Financial Act creates new possibilities for investors wishing to sue for damages); N.
POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4.5, at 178-79 (1991) (hereinaf-
ter Poser] (explaining various ways in which a private investor may bring a civil law-
suit under the Financial Services Act and new rules promulgated by the SIB).
204. See Banoff, supra note 144, at 162 (noting that the SIB has suggested that it
has new powers under the Financial Services Act); Poser, supra note 203, § 3.7.4, at
290-92 (describing the SIB's powers to seek injunctions and restitution orders).
205. See Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 297 (stating that a
lack of civil remedies in the United Kingdom is an obstacle to effective insider trading
enforcement); but see Poser, supra note 203, § 3.7.6, at 293-98 (discussing the implica-
tions of section 62 of the Financial Services Act which provides for private lawsuits and
imposes liabilities on issuers and other fiduciaries).
206. Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 298. Parliament needs to
provide express remedies because the courts have not applied basic common law princi-
ples to insider trading cases. Id. Parliament has not given the courts incentive to
broaden the scope of the common law in this area; the Insider Act expressly states that
no transaction is void per se as a result of violations of the Act's provisions. See Insider
Act, supra note 145, at § 8(3) (excepting transgressions of certain provisions of the Act
from grounds for voidability). In addition, the British government opposes using civil
remedies against insiders due to a perception of impracticality. Comment, Recent De-
velopments, supra note 131, at 297-98.
207. See Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 131, at 298 (advocating the
use of certain civil remedies).
208. Id. at 290. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides civil
restitution for corporations and shareholders. Id. Courts also have implied a cause of
action for injured investors from section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5, a
regulation promulgated under the Act. Id. Many view these remedies as positive mea-
sures that encourage investors and companies to bring suits against suspected violators.
Id.
209. Id. at 295. See generally, L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 723-810 (1988) (providing a comprehensive discussion of Rule lOb-5).
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resulted from these referrals. 210 This demonstrates that enactment of
legislation may not change a nation's approach to a particular issue. It
may be easy to harmonize the EEC's laws, but it will be far more diffi-
cult to harmonize its Member States' hearts.
IV. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A. HISTORICAL APPROACH
While the United Kingdom has a fairly rigorous scheme of statutory
insider trading prohibitions, the Federal Republic of Germany has only
voluntary guidelines.21 Historically, no tradition of insider trading reg-
ulation in either the German corporation (company) or stock exchange
law existed. 12 In the 1960's, however, some investors, wary of stock
market abuses, began advocating for a stock exchange law prohibiting
insider trading.213 As a result, in November 1970, a committee of stock
exchange experts, 1 4 established by the Ministry of Economics, adopted
the Recommendations for the Solution of the So-Called Insider
Problems, a voluntary code. 215 The Federal Republic of Germany and
Great Britain's divergent approach to insider trading and the central
role that Germany plays in European economics indicate that an analy-
sis of Germany's experience regulating insider trading is useful in de-
210. Id. It also should be noted that by 1987 no one convicted of violating the
insider provisions had gone to prison, and the overall sentencing was rather light.
Houle, supra note 150, at 163.
211. See Houle, supra note 150, at 218 (noting that insider regulations in West
Germany are not part of federal law, but only serve as guidelines which operate on a
contractual level between employees and employers): see also Note, Toward the Unifi-
cation, supra note 11, at 442 (stating that Germany's insider guidelines are voluntary);
Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (stating that the goal of the insider provisions was to
encourage voluntary self-regulation).
212. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines-Spring-gun or Scarecrow?, 8
J. Cohip. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT. L. 381 (1986).
213. See id. (noting that investors had become increasingly reluctant to participate
in the market as a result of the large losses suffered by uninformed investors). The
German government supported an examination of the securities market due to the sus-
pected significant abuse by insiders. Rider, supra note 55, at 245.
214. See Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (stating that the Federal Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs formed the committee in 1968 to make recommendations for amending
German securities laws). It was composed of all parties who the regulations would
affect. Houle, supra note 150, at 218. Its goal was to reform the stock markets in order
to encourage investment. J. Zahn, Regulation of Insider Trading in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 2 INT'L Bus. L. 92 (1974).
215. See Zahn, supra note 214, at 92 (stating that the committee ratified the vol-
untary code unanimously); Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (discussing the approval of the
Committee's "Recommendations for the So-Called Insider Problems").
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termining the prospects for effective implementation of the Council
Directive.
The history of insider trading regulation that preceded the adoption
of the voluntary guidelines is sparse. In German company law, the sole
provision that even tangentially prohibits insider trading is in the Ger-
man Act on Stock Corporations.216 This Act imposes a standard of
care217 upon the members of the Vorstand. 1 8 Because directors have a
responsibility to ensure that a company uses its holdings for the good of
the business, the law could apply to insider trading cases.21 9
The German courts also have provided some basis for insider regula-
tion.220 Courts have held that directors must act with "good faith" to-
ward their corporate entity. 22' Other decisions require shareholders to
exercise "good faith" in dealing with corporate securities and hold
company directors liable for the abuse of privileged information.222 Few
regulatory provisions or enforcement powers existed in West Germany
at the time the Minister of Economics formed the special committee to
examine securities law.223
On November 13, 1970, a unanimous 2  Committee 225 passed the
Recommendations for the Solution of the So-Called Insider Trading
216. The German Act on Stock Corporations (Aktiengesetz) (Sept. 6, 1965, as
amended) [hereinafter Stock Act].
217. Id. at art. 93 T (I) (as translated in Rider, supra note 56, at 243). The Stock
Act, supra note 216, provides in relevant part:
In managing the company, the members of the Vorstand shall act with the care
of a diligent and prudent executive. They shall not reveal any confidential infor-
mation and secrets of the company, and in particular business and trade secrets,
which have become known to them in connection with their activities as members
of the Vorstand.
Id.
218. See DICTIONARY OF LEGAL, COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL TERMS (1986) (de-
fining Vorstand as a "broad management or board of directors of a company").
219. See Rider, supra note 55, at 243 (discussing duties and potential liability of
corporate managers); see also id. at 243-44 (discussing other possible interpretations of
German company law that may apply to insider trading).
220. See id. at 244 (stating that courts may use German "common law" in some
insider trading cases).
221. Id.
222. Id. There are no cases directly on point regarding management or shareholder
duties or obligations under German law. Id. The various duties implied from the ex-
isting case law are merely speculative of what courts might actually hold if they ad-
dressed the issue directly. Id.
223. See Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of
Self-Restraint?, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507, 519 (1986) (commenting that the lack
of civil and common law remedies for insider abuse created the need for the
guidelines).
224. Zahn, supra note 214, at 92.
225. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing the formation, compo-
sition and function of the Committee of Experts).
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Problems. The Committee sought to curb the growing tide of suspected
insider abuse 26 in a self-regulating 227 manner and on a voluntary ba-
sis.22 In 1976, upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance
and the Committee of Stock Exchanges,229 the Committee replaced the
1970 provisions with the Guidelines of 1976.230 Many of West Ger-
many's financial services industries assisted in drafting the 1976
rules.211 The new provisions greatly enhanced the original regulations 23 2
and maintained the support of Germany's major financial
institutions. 3
B. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE GUIDELINES
Before considering the various provisions of the Guidelines, it is nec-
essary to discuss their legal nature. Contrary to the requirements of the
EEC Directive and unlike the Insider Act in the United Kingdom, the
German Guidelines are not national law.234 Companies enter into or
226. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the realization by both
investors and the German government of the increased exploitation of the markets
through insider trading).
227. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 382 (stating that the Committee quickly adopted
the self-regulatory guidelines to avert more restrictive legislation).
228. See Zahn, supra note 214, at 92 (stating that the goal of the Guidelines is to
prevent insider trading through voluntary regulations, and that because the industry
considers the provisions to be commercial guidelines there is a willingness to adhere to
them); Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (stating that the preface to the Committee report
on insider trading clearly stated that parties should follow the rules created on a volun-
tary basis).
229. See Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (discussing the roles of the Ministry of Fi-
nance and the Committee of Stock Exchanges).
230. Id.; see also Hopt, supra note 212, at 392 (stating that by 1978, 226 busi-
nesses, representing 84% of share capital, recognized the 1976 rules).
231. Rider, supra note 55, at 245. The industries that participated in creating the
1976 Guidelines were: the Federation of German Banks, the Federation of German
Stock Exchanges, the Federation of General Banks, the Federation of German Indus-
try, the Federation of Federated Business Banks, the Federation of German National
Banks and Natural Resource Banks, the Federation of German Retailers, the Federa-
tion of German Wholesalers and German Import and Export Merchants, the Federa-
tion of the Insurance Companies, and German Savings Banks. Id.
232. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 391 (commenting that some viewed the initial
guidelines as too narrow, and the Committee subsequently broadened them in 1976):
see also Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (stating that the 1976 provisions made the former
guidelines "more rational, practical and flexible").
233. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 382 (stating that the Committee has barely re-
formed the Guidelines since the mid-1970's, and that German financial institutions
continue to be the primary supporters of the insider rules).
234. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the voluntary nature of
the Guidelines); see also Hopt, supra note 212. at 383 (stating that the Guidelines are
not rules of the state and cannot be accorded semi-mandatory status as trade usages).
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opt out of the Guidelines on a strictly private basis. 235 The Guidelines
are usually included in the employment contract.23 6 Consequently,
while various review boards may determine whether a violation has oc-
curred, they have no power to levy sanctions against a disclosed in-
sider.237 Thus, a company must pursue any litigation on its own.238
C. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE GUIDELINES
The definition of inside information under the German law is
broad. 239 The Guidelines define inside information as information con-
cerning known or unknown events which may influence the evaluation
of insider records. 240 The Guidelines, however, limit the breadth of this
statement by listing specific examples of inside information. 24 ' This
privileged information includes knowledge of substantial changes in
corporate earnings, capital, planned dividends, transfers, mergers, ac-
quisitions, and other significant financial considerations.242 Finally, fur-
ther complicating matters, the uniformly accepted definition of inside
235. See Rider, supra note 55, at 246 (noting that Insider Trading Guidelines
Rules 4 and 5 clearly provide for a solely contractual relationship). Rule 4 states that
the Guidelines are strictly voluntary and that violations do not result in criminal or
legal proceedings against the violator. Id. Rule 5 enforces the contractual nature of the
provisions by stating that companies need only request or require that employees ad-
here to them, and that a violation can lead to an action in contract. Id.
236. Hopt, supra note 212, at 383. The Guidelines usually apply to management
and provide for acceptance of the insider prohibitions. Id.
237. Id. German law considers a review board to be a vehicle through which an
insider and his company conduct arbitration. Id.
238. See Rider, supra note 55, at 246 (commenting that Rule 4 of the Insider
Guidelines provides companies a private right of action). Profits that insider trading
generates usually revert to the company whose information is disclosed. Id.
239. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 384 (stating that initially the definition of inside
information under the Guidelines appears broad).
240. Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (citing Insider Trading Guidelines, § 2(3)(I)).
241. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 384 (noting that the Guidelines include both a
broad prohibition and a specific list of inside information); see also Rider, supra note
55, at 245-46 (observing that the definition of inside information includes both general
information about a company's financial circumstances and a specific list of
prohibitions).
242. Rider, supra note 55, at 246 (citing Insider Trading Guidelines, § 2(3)(1)).
The Insider Trading Guidelines provide in relevant part that knowledge of the follow-
ing constitutes inside information:
(a) Capital reduction or the raising of capital, including capital increases out of
company sources.
(b) The completion of a management or profit-sharing agreement.
(c) Takeover or compensation offer.
(d) Merger, amalgamation, state transferral or modification.
(e) Liquidation.
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information hinges on whether the information is available to the pub-
lic and not on whether the inside information is privileged.4 3
Since differing interpretations of the definition in the guidelines
could confuse its meaning and broaden its scope, a more general defini-
tion could resist uncertainty. " Such a definition might include prohibi-
tions on anyone with non-public information materially related to a tar-
get security, obtained by virtue of a position within a given corporation,
from dealing in that security. 245 It is important to note that the Com-
mission of the Stock Exchange, a group of experts composed of the
leading financial institutions in Germany, drafted the traditional defini-
tion.246 While changing the legal system appears simple, changing the
attitudes of the parties involved may prove more difficult. This paradox
presents itself throughout consideration of the various German insider
regulations.
While the German definition of insider is less inclusive than the Brit-
ish definition, 7 several commentators debate its actual breadth.2 5 Es-
sentially, the Insider Trading Guidelines apply only to employees, usu-
ally management, and stockholders who hold more than twenty-five
percent of a company's shares. 29 A few provisions apply to outside fi-
243. See Blum, supra note 223, at 519 (commenting on the importance of whether
or not the exploited information is public); Rider, supra note 55, at 246 (stating that
the definition of inside information hinges on whether or not the information was avail-
able to the public when used); see also Zahn, supra note 214, at 93 (noting that the
Guidelines prohibit the use of inside information prior to publication).
244. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 384-86 (encouraging broadening the definition of
insider trading in order to establish "certainty o law").
245. Id. at 385-86.
246. Comment, New EEC Draft Directive, supra note 38, at 128.
247. See id. (stating that the Guideline's definition or insider is less inclusive than
the definition under the British Insider Act); Comment, Harmonization of the Member
States, supra note 78, at 170-71 (noting that the German definition of insider is both
less inclusive and more inflexible than either the British or French approaches).
248. See Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (noting that the Guidelines lack standards
for determining which employees have insider status and that a company can unilater-
ally determine the insider status of its employees).
249. J. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE 108 (1985)
(citing Insider Trading Directives as of 1976, § 2(l)(a)-(d)). The Insider Trading
Guidelines, provide in relevant part that insiders include:
(a) legal representatives and members of the supervisory board of the company;
(b) any such representatives of connected domestic companies;
(c) domestic shareholders, including their legal representatives and supervisory
board members, where they have more than a twenty-five percent interest in the
company; and
(d) employees of the company and of domestic companies connected % ith it and
twenty-five percent shareholders in connected domestic companies.
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duciaries such as banks or employees of a subsidiary.250
The German Guidelines do not cover secondary insiders, or tip-
pees, 251 whom the EEC Directive addresses.252  It is questionable
whether the Guidelines permit all tippees to trade on privileged infor-
mation.2 53 The grounds for this possible exception are found in the pro-
hibition on insiders from trading "by virtue of their position. 25 4
The Guidelines prohibit an insider from dealing in a stock if the
stockbroker exploited insider information in making a trading deci-
sion. 255 The Guidelines also prohibit an insider from dealing in order to
benefit a third party. 256 Moreover, while the Guidelines exclude tip-
pees,257 they arguably prohibit tipping if the tipper deals through a
third party.258
Finally, due to a perceived difficulty in international enforcement, 59
basic prohibitions of the Insider Guidelines do not extend beyond Ger-
250. See id. at 109. These insiders include third parties "on equal footing" with the
insider, such as banks, credit agencies, or other outside people whose positions allow
them access to inside information. Id.
251. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 4.
252. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting the importance that the
EEC places on tippees); see Houle, supra note 150, at 219 (stating that if a person
receives information in a way unrelated to her employment, then the Guidelines do not
prohibit trading on that information); Hopt, supra note 212, at 384 (stating that the
Guidelines exclude tippees).
253. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 396 n.27 (commenting that section I of the
Guidelines, which prohibits insiders from trading by virtue of their position, may be
given a narrow or broad interpretation).
254. Id. at 395 n.22 (citing Insider Trading Guidelines, § I). The Insider Trading
Guidelines provide that insiders may not trade using information obtained "by virtue of
their position." Id.
255. Id. at 384; see Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (noting the prohibition that an
insider may not use inside information to help him decide to deal for his own benefit).
The obligations imposed under the Guidelines, however, do not prohibit management
personnel from owning or trading shares in their own company. Hopt, supra note 212,
at 385. They simply cannot exploit inside information to their own benefit. Id.
256. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 384 (explaining Insider Trading Guidelines
I(1)); see also Houle, supra note 147, at 220 (stating that an insider may not trade for
the benefit of a third-party); Rider, supra note 55, at 245 (stating that an insider may
not deal with insider documents obtained by virtue of her position, in order to benefit a
third party).
257. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text (noting that the Guidelines
exclude tippees).
258. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 385 (noting that the extent to which the Guide-
lines prohibit an insider from tipping depends on whether that insider is tipping in
order to make a deal through the tippee). Hopt also suggests that the tipper must
"solicit" the third party's involvement in the deal. Id. If the third party acts indepen-
dently, then the tipper does not violate the Guidelines. Id.
259. See id. (stating that international application would create enforcement
problems).
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man borders.2 60 The Guidelines also do not apply to a company's sub-
sidiaries,261 due to the inherent difficulty of forcing voluntary submis-
sion to rules.262 This extraterritorial exception to a national prohibition
on insider trading is consistent with the EEC Directive.62
D. ENFORCEMENT
Codifying national laws to prohibit insider trading is instrumental in
providing a system of uniform regulation. Enforcement of prohibitions
is paramount to determining a regulation's effectiveness. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, review boards of the various stock exchanges
enforce the Guidelines.21" These boards primarily ensure compliance
with the Guidelines' rules 2 5 by investigating the facts of a case.2 8 The
review boards utilize several investigatory methods including inquiry,
denunciation, and requests for documents from persons and institu-
tions.2 16  The strength of the review board's suspicion determines the
extent of the investigation.268 It is important to note, however, that sus-
260. See id. at 384 (stating that applying the voluntary Guidelines would hinder a
parent company located overseas and other international business relationships).
261. See id. (speculating that the voluntary nature of the rules creates a significant
problem with forcing a subsidiary to obey the prohibitions).
262. Id.
263. See Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 5, at 31 (providing for regulation
insofar as a certain security is traded on a national exchange within a given country's
border).
264. Insider Trading Guidelines, § 3 (as translated in Hopt, supra note 212, at
383). The review board consists of a president, four members and four deputies. Rider,
supra note 55, at 246. The president of the Supreme Court nominates the president
and his deputy and they are considered experienced in commercial matters. Id. The
representatives then elect them from the various federations that participate in the reg-
ulatory scheme. Id. Finally, four other members and their deputies are elected from a
pool of company representatives. Id. Two of the four members must have professional
experience in the stock exchange. Id. A committee appointment lasts for three years.
Id; see also Hopt, supra note 212, at 390-91 (explaining the committee selection
process).
265. Rider, supra note 55, at 246.
266. Hopt, supra note 212, at 383; see also Rider, supra note 55, at 246-47
(describing the Committee's investigatory function).
267. See Rider, supra note 55, at 246-47 (setting forth the various mechanisms
through which the Committee can perform its duties).
268. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 391 (stating that if a strong suspicion exists that
does not implicate any particular person or group, the Committee may obtain informa-
tion from all relevant sources). This information might include where the party depos-
ited the securities and which insider dealings the party may have performed with re-
gard to the said securities. Id. An insider who the rules bind impliedly allows a bank to
disclose relevant information concerning possible insider transactions. Houle, supra
note 150, at 220. If the insider does not allow the bank to reveal the requested informa-
tion, the Committee may take legal action against the insider to compel the disclosure.
Id.
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pected insiders and other persons with relevant information must will-
fully submit to the Guidelines in order to be subject to inquiry. 69
If a violation has occurred, the accused must pay the costs incurred
during the investigation. ° In the event of a violation, a report will be
sent to the relevant parties involved, including the minister of the stock
exchange.7 1 Once the committee conducts the investigation, it sets
forth final findings in writing. 72 As noted earlier, at this point the com-
mittee cannot make legal determinations or impose sanctions. 273
The voluntary system in Germany may be less effective than a statu-
tory scheme.2 7 4 The dearth of established insider abuse cases reported
by review boards or in the financial press supports this contention. 2"7
The desire for voluntary commitment, lower costs, and more flexibility,
when compared to greater authority and equality obtained through ac-
cess to the legal process, exemplify the underlying issues in the debate
between voluntary and statutory insider trading regulatory schemes. 276
Because the German system applies only to companies on the open
market, it affects only one-fourth of all German stock corporations. 7
It is, therefore, difficult to assert that the German system of enforce-
ment is consistent with the principles set forth in the EEC Directive.
269. Hopt, supra note 212, at 391.
270. See id. at 391 (stating that the Committee decides to what extent it should
assign costs); see also Rider, supra note 55, at 247 (stating that in the event of a
breach, the accused must pay costs).
271. See id. at 390 (stating that these parties may include legal representatives of
the company, members of the board of directors, presidents of relevant credit banks, as
well as the minister of the affected stock exchange). Note that except in cases of gross
abuse, communication to third parties requires consent from the insider. Rider, supra
note 55, at 247. In cases of excessive abuse, however, the Committee may publish its
findings without the accused's permission. Hopt, supra note 212, at 390.
272. See Rider, supra note 55, at 247 (stating that the Committee will give a for-
mal written finding, prior to which the accused may defend himself or herself either in
writing or by personal appearance).
273. Supra note 235 and accompanying text.
274. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 392 (favoring statutory regulation over self-regu-
lation because both the hearings and the publication of the suspected offenses are
public).
275. See id. at 391-92 (discussing cases involving several companies and hundreds
of people in which the Committee suspected insider trading and rendered no finding of
actual abuse, and also discussing the fact that the financial press has written on several
insider cases, and reported no positive findings of abuse).
276. See id. at 392 (discussing the pros and cons of a voluntary versus a statutory
system of securities regulation).
277. Id. at 392-93. As of 1985, only 450 German companies had shares trading on
one of the national stock exchanges. Id. at 393. By the end of 1982, there were 2,140
stock companies and 350,000 companies with some liability. Id.
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E. SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
Criminal sanctions are not available under the German Insider Trad-
ing Guidelines.278 The legal nature of the insider provisions, however,
does allow a company to pursue private action against an insider.Y In
this regard, the most common sanction is disgorgement of all profits or
transfer of assets acquired in avoiding a loss to the company with
which the insider has established the requisite contractual relation-
ship.2 " The Guidelines do not consider civil remedies. 21
Unlike Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany needs to
take significant steps to bring its insider trading regulations into accor-
dance with the EEC Council Directive. The lack of German regulation
of its securities industry creates the impression that it accepts the
Guidelines as appropriate and effective. Additionally, Germany's small
and less active markets may have an interest in not shaking investor
confidence through strict and authoritative regulatory measures. 82 The
cost of implementing regulatory devices also could easily outweigh ben-
efits of uniform regulation in a relatively small market. 23 As one prom-
inent German commentator wrote in 1986, while the EEC Commission
debated an insider trading directive, "[t]he attitude of the German pro-
fessions is to reject the EEC's efforts; the German jurisprudence is still
waiting. ' 2 4
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Community Council Directive is a substantial step to-
ward the creation of uniform regulation of insider trading. Its success
or failure depends on two key elements. First, the individual Member
278. Houle, supra note 150, at 221; see also Hopt, supra note 212. at 388 (positing
that criminal law cannot enforce the Guidelines because the provisions are non-statu-
tory, unofficial, and unsanctioned in nature).
279. See supra notes 235, 238 and accompanying text (discussing a company's pri-
vate right of action).
280. See Hopt, supra note 212, at 388 (stating that a transfer of all assets made
during the illegal dealings to the company for whom the insider worked is the usual
form of sanction).
281. See id. at 389 (stating that the Guidelines neither include nor exclude civil
actions). In stock market deals, the trader benefits, while the company being traded
suffers no material harm. Id. Moreover, everyone else who traded at the skewed market
rate has no identifiable recourse. Id. Thus, the company being traded on insider infor-
mation for "transfer of profits" would be most likely to bring a civil suit. Id.
282. Kubler, supra note 5, at 114.
283. Id.
284. Hopt, supra note 212, at 393. Hopt also noted that Germany has harmonized
some laws with other securities directives and that a proposed insider directive would
likely leave the choice of sanctions to the Member States. Id at 393-94.
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States must realize the benefits of the exchange of information and the
potential for broad-based cooperation. Additionally, Member States,
especially those which have not yet codified insider trading prohibi-
tions, must implement comprehensive enforcement provisions and se-
vere sanctions to deter illegal dealing.
As the EEC-a free-trade zone consisting of twelve independent na-
tions-is particularly susceptible to transnational insider trading, the
exchange of information required by Article 8 and 10 of the Council
Directive is crucial.28 5 While the Directive does mention international
cooperation in the Preamble and in three separate Articles, words alone
will not solve the mutual exchange problems between twelve indepen-
dent states. The establishment of a regulatory body, the "contact com-
mittee," will therefore greatly enhance the prospect for free exchange
of information. To be effective, however, this body must have the au-
thority to determine when information might compromise the sover-
eignty, security, or public policy of a particular Member State. To al-
low the Member States to avoid cooperation based on a pretext of
sovereignty, security, or public policy would frustrate the clear intent of
the Council Directive.
Provision of some degree of central authority and guidance can ad-
dress the second major consideration, comprehensive enforcement and
adequate sanctions. While this may compromise the Directive's princi-
ples of self-implementation and enforcement, Member States should
seek to have a central information center for gathering and analyzing
relevant market information from all twelve markets. This central au-
thority also should possess the power to conduct full-scale investiga-
tions.2 86 In order to preserve sovereign integrity, each Member State
would carry out any criminal or civil proceeding under its own insider
laws.
Finally, a strict and widely recognized set of criminal and civil sanc-
tions is necessary in order to realize the Directive's goals of uniform
investor protection." 7 An insider must not feel "safer" in some Mem-
ber States than in others. If this were the case, then the overall situa-
tion would remain substantially unchanged. The most direct and effec-
285. Supra note 105 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (stressing the importance of
uniform law and investor protection in meeting the EEC's economic goals). A common
investigatory scheme would prevent an insider in one country from being under less
scrutiny than an insider in another Member State, thus furthering the goals of EEC
market interpretation.
287. See supra notes 118-19, 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions
under the Directive).
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tive means of accomplishing uniform provisions would be to amend the
Council Directive. 288
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the insider trading provisions in the United Kingdom
and The Federal Republic of Germany has significant implications for
determining the future success of the EEC Directive. As the United
Kingdom regulations are highly codified and served as a model for the
Directive, 2" British success or failure in dealing with insider trading is
indicative of expectations for the EEC.210 The "scienter" requirement
employed in British insider regulations, 29 1 as well as its statutory de-
fenses 2912 and lackluster enforcement record, 29 3 indicate that treatment
of insider trading in the United Kingdom is not only different from the
EEC's provisions, but also has not been completely successful. Those
Member States that implement provisions similar to the British stat-
utes in response to the Directive's requirements may find similar diffi-
culties in realizing their intended goals.
As for the treatment of insider trading in Germany, an analysis must
consider several factors in determining the prospects for success of the
EEC Directive. While there is some room for interpretation of the
Guidelines, the basic prohibition of dealing on inside information set
forth in the EEC Directive appears to exist. The Germans will have to
re-work their prohibitions on tipping, however, in order to meet the cri-
teria set forth in the Council Directive. This may be an arduous task,
288. Amending the Directive to provide for an express private right of action would
greatly enhance its effectiveness. In the United States, for example, the courts have
developed a private cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 380 (1983). Many widely recognize this private cause of action as a neces-
sary and valuable compliment to the regulatory scheme that the SEC administers. See
Note, In Pari Delicto and Insider Trading: Dead or Alive?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1169, 1175, 1198 (1987) (noting that both the Supreme Court and the SEC have rea-
soned that the private right of action is a necessary supplement to the Commission's
enforcement operation); see also, Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors
Under SEC Rule IOb-5: A Policy Doctrinal, and Econonic Analysis, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 1959, 1963 (1987) (stating that the private cause of action under Rule lOb-5
buttresses SEC enforcement and provides a crucial deterrence mechanism necessary in
securities transactions). As the private cause of action has been effective in United
States regulatory efforts, utilizing this method of investor protection should compliment
the Directive's statutory provisions as well.
289. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
290. See Rider, supra note 55, at 243 (asserting that British regulation has signifi-
cant impact on the prospects for Community-wide success).
291. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing British insider laws).
292. Supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
293. Supra notes 205-07, 210-11 and accompanying text.
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as most major German financial institutions participated in the creation
of the original guidelines and have maintained their support for the
initial provisions. 9
A further consideration in determining the prospects for future regu-
latory success is that the voluntary Guidelines may reflect German atti-
tudes toward insider regulations in general. If this is the case, signifi-
cant philosophical and legal changes will have to occur. The EEC
Directive requires the Member States to establish competent adminis-
trative authorities to regulate insider trading,9 5 and at this point the
German scheme is neither nationally enforced nor administrative in
nature.
Germany is not unique. Seven other Member States do not have stat-
utory regulations prohibiting insider trading.2"' The same factors that
have affected the German attitude towards insider regulations, rela-
tively small markets and the expense of implementing advanced regula-
tory mechanisms,197 may indeed affect other countries of the EEC as
well, and hinder the ultimate goal of an advanced, integrated system of
regulations, replete with mutual cooperation and a uniform level of in-
vestor protection.
294. Supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
295. Council Directive, supra note 32, art. 8.
296. Supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
297. Supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
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